Essay Exam #3

[a1]

     The logical argument concerning the problem of evil comes in at least two different forms. The first example considers four statements of belief that are universally shared by monotheists, then inserts evil into the equation. The outcome on the philosophical calculator, or the sum as it were, is incoherent. It doesn't “add up.” Here is the traditional argument in equation form:

God exists

God is omnipotent

God is omnibenevolent + Evil exists = Error message/God does not exist.

God is omniscient

      Why? Because if God was omnipotent, He could eradicate evil; if omnibenevolent He would not want evil to exist. Based on these premises, it seems illogical that God exists‒ given the certainty that evil exists. (Note that evil is synonymous with pain, suffering, disease, and other negative conditions of being). The argument can be further condensed into a syllogism:

Premise 1: Either God exists or suffering exists, but not both.

Premise 2: Suffering exists.

Conclusion: Therefore, God does not exist.

      For the logic of this argument to work, one has to prove the first premise; it's obvious that suffering exists, but does that preclude the existence of a God? Therein, of course, lies the rub... why would a God allow such seeming injustices as the suffering of innocent children or animals? It doesn't seem a noble quality from an entity who might have made circumstances in this universe much better. But then again, an omniscient being might have reasons that are beyond our comprehension; we may very well be overstepping our rights as cosmic citizens to question the authority of the Creator.

[a2]

     Generally considered the strongest rebuttal of the Problem of Evil is the “Free-Will” defense, as attributed to Alvin Plantinga from his work God, Freedom, and Evil. It consists of two stages; the first arguing that atheists have never proven God and evil to be mutually exclusive, and the second being an attempt to demonstrate that they can be compatible.

     In undertaking an analysis of the Free-Will defense, it is important to make the distinction between a defense and a theodicy. The latter is a morally arguable reason that God would permit evil; whereas a defense doesn't have to explain why, but merely challenge the incompatibility. Call them what one will, these tactics tend to support the theist position, and while ultimately they never close the deal, neither do the atheist's arguments‒ it is a back-and-forth exchange, in which theism is unfalsifiable and both positions are unverifiable. (It makes one wonder... could God Himself prove His existence, or should it be considered a pseudo-task, akin to creating a square circle?)

     Plantinga's first phase anticipates the various objections that Problem of Evil proponents (such as J. L. Mackie) might throw at him, at length refining them into what he sees as the ultimate hurdle:

An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being can properly eliminate every evil.

     So how does Plantinga counter this? He merely says, to the atheists: “it hasn't been proven.” (It seems an awful lot of work, all these thought experiments and counterexamples, only to arrive at that).

Phase two of the Free-Will defense fares somewhat better:

“A world containing creatures who are significantly free... and perform more good than evil... is more valuable than a world containing no free creatures...”

     Basically, Plantinga is inferring that because God allows us choices, some evil results. It's a fairly sound argument until he's asked how to explain natural evils (disasters, epidemics, etc.) His answer there: Satan and/or lesser demons! (And thereby removing all his credibility, on any empirical basis). Being a defense, he doesn't have to be as credible, fair enough... but that sets the bar quite low.

[a3]

     William Rowe's evidential/inductive argument from evil is a refinement of the traditional one, striving for an improved empirical framework, and with premises that are more meticulous:

Premise 1- Morally unjustified/pointless suffering exists.

Premise 2- If God exists, no such suffering would exist.

Conclusion: Therefore, God does not exist.

      Again, as in the traditional form, everything hinges on the validity of the first premise. Is there such a thing as pointless evil/suffering? While the common sense answer for many would be “yes”, Rowe goes out of his way to find a poignant example: a fawn trapped in a forest fire, burnt badly and then suffering in agony for several days. Surely this would be unjustified; no baby deer could deserve such a fate, and no God would allow it.

     It is a decidedly strong argument, but needless to say, it is also subject to dissection and dismissal. The opposition can posit that our knowledge is infinitesimally small compared to a divine entity; the ultimate reasons for what God allows to occur are beyond what we can understand from our limited perspective. It makes no sense, for our purposes, when babies die, when homes burn to the ground, when good people have horrible luck and evil people prosper, and any other examples we can conjure.

     But the theist/apologist doesn't see the contradiction. To paraphrase, in the almost defeatist mantra that Christianity has given us for such dilemmas, we're supposed to shake our heads, wipe our tears, and say to God “Thy will be done.”

     How to respond to that? I guess we ultimately have to come to our own reckoning, as individuals. If it seems unjust, if something about the whole grand scheme doesn't feel right... well, from where do these thoughts arise? If God created us “in his image”, do we not have enough grasp of benevolence and of justice to realize when they are absent? It's impossible to know on what scale or dimension a God would rationalize the events that are significant to us, when they likely have little or no impact on His plane of existence.

[a4]

     Abductive reasoning seeks to find the simplest and most likely explanations for observations and theories, and has been applied to the problem of evil argument in that manner. Paul Draper's version is typical, and posits that the evils and problems of the world are better explained by an atheistic universe than one overseen by a god. It's a common-sensical approach to the debate, not having to rely on complex premises, thought-experiments, examples vs. counterexamples, etc. While not definitive‒ (and is anything?)‒ some philosophers consider it the stronger of the various forms. Here is the schematic:

• Moral agents (basically adult humans) experience pain and pleasure that is biologically useful.

• Sentient beings that are not moral agents (children/animals) experience the same.

• This collective of sentient beings, moral agents or not, also experience sensations not biologically useful.

• Therefore, God does not exist.

     In a nutshell, the three premises are less surprising in a godless realm. The simplest explanation tends to be the best (per William of Ockham et al). To rationalize God with evil takes a serious amount of argument and hypothesizing; to accept the alternative is easy. God and Evil are counter-intuitive.

     Stairs and Bernard continue with the various defenses from theists against the abductive argument; they are, of course, either overly complex or intentionally ambiguous, and support what they attempt to discredit. But that's just my opinion. It seems safe to guess that the debate will not be settled soon.

[b]

     The unanimity thesis states that “mystics everywhere have fundamentally the same type of experience” (Rowe/Philosophy of Religion). Whether through Christian mysticism, Sufism, Buddhism, Hinduism, or even secular approaches‒ “we become one with the Absolute and become aware of our oneness... we find the same recurring note... an eternal unanimity” (William James).

     Although not mentioned directly in our course textbooks, I found a reference to a very similar idea in Stairs and Bernard's Chapter 6/ “Religious Experience” where they discuss Gary Gutting (141).

     Gutting's observation is that “direct, non-sensory perceptions” of a divine entity are so widespread in history and cultures, that the cumulative weight of them are a good argument for such an existence. In other words, it's similar to a “unanimous” vote‒ the world's mystics seem to have come to a consensus on the subject.

     An introverted mystical experience is simply one that is focused inward; more of an intuition or reflection than a religious feeling caused by an outer stimulus. Often obtained through some form of meditation or other means to reach an heightened state of awareness, these experiences tend to reach very deeply into the psyche and are repeatable. They therefore have more influence and impact than the comparatively random and fleeting extroverted states, such as seeing a rainbow. It is the similarity of these epiphanies, from such diverse sources, that argues for their being veridical‒ there are so many witnesses, to use a legal analogy; or repeatable results as one would look for in scientific experiments, that it follows that there is some truth to the reported phenomena. William Rowe lists six common qualities that introverted mystical experiences tend to possess:

1. A state of consciousness that is devoid of its ordinary contents: sensations, images, thoughts, desires, and so forth.
2. An experiences of absolute oneness, with no distinctions or divisions.
3. Sense of reality, that one is experiencing what is ultimately real.
4. Feeling that what is experienced is divine.
5. Sense of complete peace and bliss.
6. Timelessness, no awareness of the passage of time during the experience.

     Probably the strongest rebuttal of the reality of these experiences came from Bertrand Russell, who pointed out that many mystics subject themselves to physical extremes‒ fasting, sensory deprivation, stringent breathing exercises... and his quote is both amusing and cutting: “no distinction between the man who eats little and sees heaven and the man who drinks much and sees snakes.” It's a bit of an oversimplification, but the mystical experience is subjective after all, despite the shared similarities.

     Another defense against the mystic experience being veridical is the chance that such might be explained by principles of psychology or neuroscience. Perhaps the brain is “wired” for these feelings, or they result from various hormonal/chemical combinations... maybe the mystical experience serves some evolutionary purpose, giving meaning to existence (and therefore encouragement to survive). Certain dreams can have a mystical quality, and this hints at a subconscious source; could there be an archetypal construct of a God or supernatural entity? Were there aliens from some highly advanced extraterrestrial civilization in our distant past? All these hypotheses and others could potentially explain mystic states, and even their seeming unanimity.

     Some critics of introverted mystical experiences reference their common claim of an atemporal, unchanging, or undifferentiated” reality and how this differs from everyday life. I think this is a misguided interpretation. By their very nature, mystical experiences contrast significantly with the more mundane aspects of the world. That is the whole point, isn't it? It's not that the mystic is claiming the universe itself is atemporal and undifferentiated‒ just that the slice of reality they encounter in their altered awareness “stops”, like a freeze-frame, allowing a very detailed and meticulous contemplation. It is not a contradiction to sense that we're “one”, yet many. It is the latter reality that makes the sudden glimpse of unity so profound and poignant. Whatever the cause: God, aliens, hallucinogens, delusions, sleep deprivation, chemical imbalances... the mystical experience is real to the mystic, in the moment. Or close enough. If the illusion is convincing, there's not much difference.